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Article: 
Behavior genetics seeks to make meaningful statements about individual behavior from knowledge of genes. It 
is interdisciplinary in the extreme because it attempts to span several levels of reality in one inferential leap. By 
level of reality, I mean the level at which matter is organized, as in this scheme giving an example at each level: 
 
A gene is a macromolecule which codes for the structure of a protein. Lehninger (1967) points out, "The ascent 
from simple self-assembling systems such as oligomeric proteins and enzyme complexes to the level of 
supramolecular organization of subcellular organelles is a very steep one. In making it we cross a boundary to a 
level of organization at which the self-assembly principle doubtless operates in microscopic regions, 
but cannot account for the biogenesis of the organelle," (p. 91). The ascent from gene to behavior is precarious 
indeed. 
 
Once the simplistic notion of rigid genetic specification of behavior is rejected, which the traditional P = G + E 
and more realistic X = H·E formulae most emphatically do, the challenge is to understand how and why genetic 
variation is associated with behavioral differences. Some practitioners seem to think this goal can be achieved 
by measuring behavior and nucleotide sequences of the individual, then connecting the two with multivariate 
analysis. On the other hand, Sinclair sees that the goal can best be realized by examining events at levels 
intermediate between gene and behavior. This impresses me as a more promising approach. To realize its goals, 
behavior genetics needs to become neurogenetics. Selective breeding for extreme scores on a measure of 
interest to psychologists can help to understand the physiological bases of individual differences, as done in the 
work on avoidance learning by Brush (1991) and co-workers, for example. 
 
Sinclair proposed a plausible and clever model of neural functions to explain a difference between two lines of 
rats selectively bred for response to a large injection of ethanol. By basing this model on established 
neurophysiological principles, he presents us with an hypothesis of considerable importance, especially if it 
turns out to be true. I welcome his openess to suggestions for further refinements. This is refreshing in a field 
where explanatory models all too often are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
 
I would recommend several steps to strengthen the enterprise. 
 
(1) Science at its best tests alternative hypotheses, not just a single null hypothesis. Genetic analysis has a 
profound weakness in its logic. Typically the results of a breeding experiment, for example, are predicted from 
a Mendelian model and then observations are tested against the model as null hypothesis. If the study is seeking 
a major gene effect, a test with low statistical power is more likely to affirm the null. Hence, a bad experiment is 
more likely to "discover" a gene. The remedy for this situation is to test several reasonable models and take one 
seriously only if the others can be rejected with confidence in light of the data. Alcohol has many effects 
throughout the body, and other hypotheses could and should be devised to explain the selection response. 
 
(2) Once we have reasonable alternatives in mind, it should be possible to design effective experiments to 
test them. The author of an hypothesis has an obligation to tell us what it predicts and how it can be evaluated. 
If one selected line shows little response to ethanol, this might involve absorption, metabolism, and elimination 
of the drug as well as effects on neurons. The neural hypothesis might be examined in vitro using the 
hippocampal slice preparation. 
 
(3) To have no evident behavioral effect of 2 mg/kg ethanol obviously requires some major adjustment of 
rat's physiology. It would be helpful to compare the selected lines to unselected controls, because it is possible 
that the high response line differs from controls for a different physiological reason than does the low line, 
especially if some of the relevant loci have dominance or if gene frequencies were very different at the outset of 
selection at different loci (which is quite possible unless a cross among inbred strains provided the foundation 
population). Furthermore, an inverse line difference as well as a positive line difference in a correlated response 
could be spurious and ought to be examined in crosses. 
 
(4) A large response to selection typically involves several segregating loci. Because the place, time, and 
mechanism of action of a gene are highly specific, it is rather unlikely that there will be only one primary site of 
gene action relevant to a line difference.. Selective breeding is totally opportunistic and accumulates whatever 
differences are available to produce line divergence. These differences may be trivial from a psychological 
perspective or they may be illuminating. If the Syracuse High and Low Avoidance (SHA and SLA) lines, for 
example, showed a large difference in sensitivity to shock, this would be seen as a trivial result because an 
animal will not learn to avoid something which is not noxious. It turns out that the SHA versus SLA difference 
is much more interesting (Brush et al., 1985; Brush, 1991), but this is essentially a matter of happenstance. On 
the other hand, selection for open-field activity under bright light yields lines which differ at the albinism locus 
(DeFries et al., 1978), a result some regard as trivial. This could have been avoided by an auspicious choice of 
ancestral strains. These thoughts return us to point 1 about the need to test alternative possibilities. Generally 
speaking, I think the time for formal models comes after extensive tests have been done to characterize the 
differences between the selected lines on many dimensions. 
 
REFERENCES 
Brush, F. R. (1991). Genetic determinants of individual differences in avoidance learning: behavioral and 
endocrine characteristics. Experientia (in press). 
Brush, F. R., Baron, S., Froelich, J. C., Ison, J. R., Pellegrino, L. J., Phillips, D. S., Sakellaris, P. C., and 
Wiliams, V. N. (1985). Genetic differences in avoidance learning by Rattus norvegicus: Escape/avoidance 
responding, sensitivity to electric shock, discrimination learning, and open-field behavior. J. Comp. Psychol. 
99:60— 73. 
DeFries, J. C., Gervais, M. C., and Thomas, E. A. (1978). Response to 30 generations of selection for open-field 
activity in laboratory mice. Behav. Genet. 8: 3-13. 
Lehninger, A. L. (1967). Cell organelles: The mitochondrion. In Quarton, G. C., Melnechuk, T., and Schmitt, F. 
O. (eds.), The Neurosciences. A Study Program, Rockefeller University Press, New York, pp. 91-100. 
